V. Arms Control and Disarmament
Since the end of the cold war the international security situation has
tended to relax, and great advances have been made in international arms
control and disarmament. The Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on
Their Destruction (CWC) was concluded in January 1993, and came into
effect in April 1997. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT) was indefinitely extended in May, 1995. The Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was opened for signature in the New York
UN headquarters in September 1996. Nuclear-weapon-free zones continue to
expand. The Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons and the Amended Protocol
on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and
Other Devices attached to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions
on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (Convention on
Certain Conventional Weapons) were adopted in October 1995 and May 1996,
respectively. And in June 1997, the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) passed a protocol for the purpose of increasing the effectiveness
of safeguards.
But in spite of such progress, there are still some problems crying out
for solutions in the sphere of disarmament. The United States and Russia
still keep their large nuclear arsenals. In addition, a few military
powers continue to stick to their cold war mentality and nuclear
deterrence policy, strenuously developing highly advanced and
sophisticated weapons, especially advanced missile defense systems. The
nuclear tests conducted by India, and then by Pakistan, in May 1998 have
not only seriously impeded international non-proliferation efforts, but
have produced a grave impact on regional and world peace and stability.
The Chinese government highly stresses the importance of arms control and
disarmament work, and takes it as an important component of its overall
diplomacy and defense policy. The Chinese government holds that the
international community should promote fair, rational, comprehensive and
balanced arms control and disarmament; the purpose of disarmament should
be to reinforce, not weaken or undermine, the security of all countries;
the universality of the international arms control treaties should be
enhanced; new treaties should be concluded through a broadly
representative multilateral negotiations mechanism; those countries
having the largest and most sophisticated conventional and nuclear
arsenals should continue to fulfil their special responsibilities for
disarmament; efforts should be made to prevent a few countries directing
the target of disarmament at a broad spectrum of developing countries in
order to deprive them of their legitimate right and means for
self-defense, at the same time taking advantage of their own advanced
military technology and superior economic strength to seek absolute
security and military superiority; the existing discriminatory and
exclusive export control mechanisms and arrangements should be overhauled
and rectified comprehensively, and a fair and rational international
non-proliferation system should be set up through negotiations on the
basis of universal participation.
China has steadfastly attended multilateral negotiations on arms control
and disarmament, and some related international conferences. In April
1997, China and Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed the
Agreement on Mutual Reduction of Military Forces in the Border Areas. It
stipulates that the five countries shall reduce their military forces in
the border areas to the minimum level compatible with their friendly and
good-neighborly relations, a level that shall not go beyond their defense
needs; none of the parties shall use or threaten to use force against the
other party or parties, neither shall they seek unilateral military
superiority; they shall reduce and limit the size of their ground force,
air force, air aviation and border guard units as well as the quantity of
main categories of their armaments and military equipment deployed in the
border areas as deep as 100 kilometers from their border; they shall
determine the ceilings for the reduced size, modality and the time limit
for the reduction of military forces; combat vessels shall not be
deployed in rivers in the above-mentioned areas; they shall exchange
relevant information and data on the military forces in the border areas;
and they shall monitor and verify the implementation of the Agreement.
China has also set up bilateral arms control consultation mechanisms with
many other countries. China has signed or ratified almost all the
multilateral arms control treaties, and faithfully fulfilled its
obligations under those treaties, making a positive contribution to the
progress of international arms control and disarmament.
The Issue of Nuclear Weapons
As a nuclear-weapon state, China vigorously supports and participates in
the international non-nuclear proliferation efforts, promotes the process
of nuclear disarmament and works hard for the realization of the final
goal of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear
weapons worldwide.
China has consistently advocated the complete prohibition and thorough
destruction of nuclear weapons. At the 51st Session of the UN General
Assembly in 1996 China clearly put forward a five-point proposal on
nuclear disarmament: 1. The major nuclear powers should abandon the
nuclear deterrence policy, and the states having the largest nuclear
arsenals should continue to drastically reduce their nuclear weapons
stockpiles; 2. all nuclear-weapon states should commit themselves not to
be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and in any circumstances,
undertake unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons
against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones, and
conclude a legally binding international document as soon as possible; 3.
all states which have deployed nuclear weapons outside their borders
should withdraw all these weapons home, and all nuclear-weapon states
should pledge to support the proposal on establishing nuclear-weapon-free
zones, respect the status of such zones and undertake corresponding
obligations; 4. no state should develop or deploy outer space weapons or
missile defense systems, which harm strategic security and stability; 5.
all states should negotiate and conclude an international convention on
the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.
From the first day it possessed nuclear weapons, China has solemnly
declared its determination not to be the first to use such weapons at any
time and in any circumstances, and later undertook unconditionally not to
use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states
or nuclear-weapon-free zones. China vigorously supports the efforts of
the relevant countries to establish nuclear-free zones on a voluntary
basis, and has signed and approved the relevant protocols of the Treaty
for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
(Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty
(Treaty of Rarotonga) and the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty
(Treaty of Pelindaba). In April 1995 China issued an official statement,
reiterating its commitment to unconditionally provide non-nuclear-weapon
states and nuclear-weapon-free zones with negative security assurance,
and for the first time promised to provide them with positive security
assurance.
In March 1992 China acceded to the NPT and has faithfully fulfilled its
international obligations to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons
and made contributions to the indefinite extension of the treaty. China
was represented at the negotiations on the CTBT from beginning to end,
and signed it on September 24, 1996, the first day the treaty was opened
for signature. China supports the early conclusion of the Convention on
Banning the Production of Fissile Materials for Nuclear Weapons or Other
Nuclear Explosive Devices (FMCT). For this purpose, the foreign ministers
of China and the United States issued a joint statement in October 1994,
saying that the two countries would make joint efforts to promote an
early conclusion of a multilateral, non-discriminatory and effectively
verifiable FMCT. In April 1997, China and four other nuclear-weapon
states -- the United States, Russia, Britain and France -- issued a
statement, reiterating their stand for concluding, through negotiation, a
FMCT as soon as possible on the basis of the mandate contained in the
Shannon Report. China supports the IAEA's Program for Strengthening the
Effectiveness and Promoting the Efficiency of the Safeguard System (93 +
2 Program), and promises that, on the basis of voluntary safeguard, China
will negotiate and conclude with the IAEA a legally binding document at a
proper time, and will adopt measures corresponding to the obligations
China undertakes in accordance with the first article of the NPT.
As the international situation is tending to relax and relations between
the major powers continue to improve, China believes that the conditions
are now ripe for nuclear-weapon states to undertake not to be the first
to use nuclear weapons against each other. So, in January 1994, China
formally presented a draft for the Treaty on the Non-First-Use of Nuclear
Weapons to the United States, Russia, Britain and France, proposing that
the five nuclear-weapon states hold discussions on the treaty as soon as
possible. China holds that such a treaty will help to promote mutual
trust among nuclear-weapon states and further reduce the danger of
nuclear war. While energetically promoting negotiations for conclusion of
a multilateral treaty, China also actively seeks, together with other
nuclear-weapon states, to undertake, on a bilateral basis, not to be the
first to use nuclear weapons against each other. So far, China and Russia
have already made such a promise to each other.
The Issue of Chemical and Biological Weapons
The Chinese government has always stood for the complete prohibition and
thorough destruction of chemical weapons. China signed the CWC in January
1993, ratified the convention in December 1996 and deposited the
instruments of ratification on April 25, 1997, thus becoming an original
signatory state to the CWC. China supports the purpose and goals of the
CWC, and advocates that chemical weapons and facilities for their
production should be destroyed as soon as possible, in accordance with
the related provisions in the CWC. Meanwhile, China holds that the
convention should promote international economic, trade, and scientific
and technological exchanges in the field of chemical industry, ensuring
that chemical industry technology truly benefits mankind.
China has been active and conscientious in fulfilling the obligations
stipulated in the CWC. It delivered the initial declaration and annual
declaration in time and in their entirety and has accepted inspections by
the convention. It has also participated in every one of the convention's
executive council meetings and the two conferences of states parties.
China has been a victim of chemical weapons. Large quantities of chemical
weapons abandoned by Japanese aggressor troops are found in China to this
day, which still threaten the lives and property of the local people and
the environment in which they live. In view of this, China demands that,
in keeping with the stipulations of the convention, any country that has
left chemical weapons in another country destroy, as soon as possible,
such weapons wholly and thoroughly.
China advocates the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of
biological weapons. It opposes the production, development and
stockpiling of biological weapons by any country, and the proliferation
of such weapons and related technology in any form by any country. In
November 1984 China acceded to the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological)
and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BWC). As a state party to the
BWC, China has fully and conscientiously fulfilled its obligations under
the convention. Since 1987 China has, year after year, reported to the
United Nations on convention-related information and data concerning
confidence-building measures, in accordance with the decisions of the
Review Conferences of the BWC.
Having suffered grievously from biological weapons attacks in the past,
China supports work that helps comprehensively to strengthen the
effectiveness of the convention. It has actively participated in the work
of drawing up a Protocol of the Ad Hoc Group of States Parties to the BWC
established in 1994, and has made contributions to the progress of the
negotiations on the Protocol. China holds, in view of the complexity of
the problems relating to the verification mechanism, that every country
should, in a down-to-earth way, seek effective and feasible verification
measures, and formulate concrete steps to prevent abuse of verification,
and to protect the rightful commercial and security secrets of states
parties. China considers that, while improving the convention's
verification mechanism, international cooperation and exchanges among
states parties in the sphere of bio-technology for peaceful purposes
should also be strengthened.
The Issue of Keeping Outer Space Weapon-Free
Outer space belongs to all mankind, and should be used exclusively for
peaceful purposes to benefit mankind. To this end, China stands for the
complete prohibition and thorough destruction of weapons deployed in
outer space. It opposes the development of anti-satellite weapons. China
maintains that the international community, the big powers with the
capacity to utilize outer space in particular, should take the following
realistic steps to prevent a weaponized outer space: A complete ban on
weapons of any kind in outer space, including anti-missile and
anti-satellite weapons, so as to keep outer space free of weapons; a ban
on the use of force or conduct of hostilities in, from or to outer space;
and all countries should undertake neither to experiment with, produce or
deploy outer space weapons nor to utilize outer space to seek strategic
advantages on the ground, for example, using disposition of the important
parts of ground anti-missile systems in outer space for the purpose of
developing strategic defensive weapons. In addition, negotiations should
be held as soon as possible for the conclusion of a legally-binding
international agreement with the above-mentioned contents.
Since the beginning of the 1980s, as one of the co-sponsors of the UN
General Assembly resolutions on keeping outer space weapon-free, China
has promoted negotiations on this problem at the Geneva Conference on
Disarmament and through other multilateral mechanisms. As early as at the
founding of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Conference on Disarmament on the
Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, China submitted to it a paper
on China's Position on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space
(CD/579). Many countries have supported China's position.
The Issue of Anti-Personnel Landmines
China has all along attached great importance to the problem of threat to
innocent people caused by the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel
landmines (APLs). It is in favor of imposing proper and rational
restrictions on the use and transfer of APLs in a bid to achieve the
ultimate objective of comprehensive prohibition of such landmines through
a phased approach. In the meantime, the Chinese government maintains
that, in addressing the problem of APLs, consideration should be given to
both humanitarian concern and the legitimate defense requirements of
sovereign states. To safeguard the safety of their people by sovereign
states through legitimate military means, including the use of APLs in
accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United
Nations itself is part and parcel of humanitarianism.
As a country with long land borders, China has to reserve the right to
use APLs on its territory pending an alternative solution is found and
its requirements in security and defense capability are catered for.
China's use of APLs under legitimate circumstances is entirely aimed at
preventing foreign military interference and aggression so as to maintain
national unity and territorial integrity and safeguard its people's
well-being. This not only represents China's legitimate national security
and defense requirements, but also accords with the relevant provisions
of the Charter of the United Nations on the right to self-defense.
The PLA has always exercised strict control over the use of APLs and
prohibited the indiscriminate use and laying of such landmines while
actively studying the possible alternatives to APLs. China has also
actively participated in the revision of the Landmine Protocol (Protocol
II) to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) and the
discussions on the question of APLs at the UN Conference on Disarmament.
The Chinese government has all along adopted a very prudent and
responsible attitude toward landmine export. In December 1994, China
joined in the UN General Assembly's consultation on its resolution
concerning the moratorium on the export of APLs. In April 1996, the
Chinese government solemnly declared its suspension of export of APLs
that are not compatible with those APLs provided for in the Amended
Landmine Protocol to the CCW.
The Chinese government is of the view that the clearance of APLs is part
and parcel of the overall efforts in eliminating the threat to innocent
civilians resulting from the indiscriminate use of such landmines. It has
consistently adopted a responsible attitude toward post-war demining
question and has done considerable fruitful work in this regard. From the
beginning of 1992 to the end of 1994, the PLA conducted its first
large-scale demining operation in the border areas of Yunnan Province and
the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, cleared a total of over one million
landmines and explosive devices and destroyed nearly 200 tons of disused
or de-activated ammunitions and explosive devices, covering an area of
108 square kilometers with over 170 border trade passes and ports
re-opened, and over 30,000 hectares of farmland, pasture and mountain
forests restored. At the end of 1997, the Chinese government decided to
conduct its second large-scale demining operation in the above areas
starting from November 1997 up to December 1999.
The Chinese government has always done its utmost to assist APL-affected
countries. It furnished Cambodia and some other mine-affected countries
with mine-detection/clearance equipment, and also helped train demining
personnel for these countries, thus contributing to their smooth post-war
rehabilitation. In November 1997, the Chinese President Jiang Zemin
declared that China would continue to actively support international
demining efforts and cooperation, including donation and provision of
assistance in the fields of demining training, technology and equipment
through the relevant international demining funds. The Chinese government
also sent observers to participate in the Signing Ceremony of the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction and the
international demining roundtable (Mine Action Forum) held from 2 to 4
December 1997 in Ottawa.
Control of the Export of Sensitive Materials and Military Equipment
The Chinese government agrees that necessary measures should be adopted
to apply effective international control to the transfer of sensitive
materials and technologies in order to prevent the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and their carriers. However, at the same
time, China holds that international efforts to prevent such
proliferation should follow the principle of fairness and rationality,
and opposes a double standard whereby anti-proliferation is used as a
pretext to infringe upon the sovereignty of other countries and harm
normal international cooperation and exchanges in the fields of economy,
trade and science and technology.
China attaches great importance to control over the export of sensitive
materials, and has implemented a series of administration measures
regarding the transfer of sensitive materials on the basis of
international practice.
Regarding nuclear exports, China, a signatory to the NPT, has pursued a
policy of not supporting, encouraging or engaging in the proliferation of
nuclear weapons and not assisting any other country to develop such
weapons. It has laid down three principles regarding nuclear exports:
They should serve peaceful purposes only; they should accept the
safeguards of the IAEA; and they should not be retransferred to a third
country without China's consent.
In November 1991 the Chinese government declared that it would report on
a continuing basis to the IAEA any export to or import from
non-nuclear-weapon states of nuclear materials of one effective kilogram
or above. In July 1993 China officially promised that it would
voluntarily report to the IAEA any imports or exports of nuclear
materials, nuclear equipment and related non-nuclear materials. In May
1996 China promised that it would not offer help to nuclear facilities
which had not accepted the IAEA's safeguards, including bans on exports
of nuclear materials and personnel or technology exchanges and
cooperation. In May 1997, the Chinese government published the Circular
on Questions Pertaining to the Strict Implementation of China's Nuclear
Exports Policy, which explicitly stipulates that no nuclear materials,
facilities or related technologies exported by China may be supplied to
or used by nuclear facilities which have not accepted the IAEA's
safeguards. The circular also has strict provisions regarding exports of
dual-use nuclear-related materials. In May 1997, China sent observers to
attend a meeting of the Zangger Committee, one of the mechanisms of
international nuclear export control, and formally joined the committee
in October of that year. In September 1997, the Chinese government issued
the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Nuclear Export
Control, banning any kind of assistance to nuclear facilities which have
not accepted the IAEA's safeguards. In addition, nuclear exports are
monopolized by the units designated by the State Council and can not be
operated by any other units or individuals. The state practices a
licensing system for nuclear exports, and has drawn up the Detailed List
of Nuclear Export Control in light of the commonly accepted listings of
this kind in the international sphere. On June 10, 1998, China
promulgated the Regulations on the Control of the Export of Dual-Use
Nuclear Materials and Related Technology, imposing strict control on the
export of nuclear-related dual-use materials and related technology.
China has always been cautious and responsible regarding the exports
administration of chemicals. It does not export chemicals that can be
used to manufacture chemical weapons, nor does it export related
technologies and equipment. It supports normal international cooperation
in chemical industry and exchanges of related scientific and
technological materials in accordance with the CWC, and opposes any
export control mechanism conflicting with the purpose of the convention.
In September 1990, the Chinese government drafted measures for strict
control of the export of chemicals and their production technologies and
equipment. In December 1995, it issued the Regulations of the People's
Republic of China on the Supervision and Control of Chemicals, and, in
accordance with these regulations, issued the List of Chemicals Subject
to Supervision and Control and the Bylaws for the Implementation of the
Regulations in June 1996, stipulating that import and export of related
chemicals are under the centralized management of the competent
departments of the chemical industry under the State Council and operated
by special companies designated by such departments.
With regard to the transfer of military equipment and related technology,
China respects the right of every country to independent or collective
self-defense and to acquisition of weapons for this purpose in accordance
with the principles contained in the Charter of the United Nations, but
at the same time it is concerned about the adverse effects on world
security and regional stability arising from excessive accumulations of
weaponry.
For many years until the early 1980s, China did not engage in weapons
exports, and since then the volume of such exports has been limited.
Beginning in the mid-1980s, China's export of military products has been
on the decrease: The volume of contracted business was just over two
billion US dollars-worth in 1987, dropped to US$ 600 million-worth in
1991, and did not exceed one billion US dollars-worth in the following
years. The 1993-97 records of the UN register of conventional arms
exports and imports of various countries show that China's exports of
conventional weapons are small compared to those of some other countries.
China practices strict control of the transfer of conventional military
equipment and related technologies, and observes the following
principles: The export of weapons must help the recipient nation enhance
its capability for legitimate self-defense; it must not impair peace,
security and stability of the relevant region and the world as a whole;
and it must not be used to interfere in the recipient state's internal
affairs. Since 1992 China has participated in the United Nations'
register of conventional arms transfers (Tables 5 and 6).
Table 5 Data of China's Participation in the United Nations Register of
Conventional
Arms Transfers in 1992-1996 (Exports)
Imte 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Total
Combat tanks 97 121 82 51 3 354
Armored cars 2 �� �� �� �� 2
Large-caliber guns 166 �� �� 20 18 204
Operational aircraft �� 68 �� �� 5 73
Attack helicopters �� �� �� �� �� ��
Naval vessels 2 �� 6 1 5 14
Missiles and launchers 24 20 �� 18 106 168
Table 6 Data of China's Participation in the United Nations Register of
Conventional Arms Transfers in 1992-1996 (Imports)
Item 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Total
Combat tanks �� �� �� �� �� ��
Armored cars �� �� �� �� �� ��
Large-caliber guns �� �� �� �� �� ��
Operational aircraft 26 �� �� �� 22 48
Attack helicopters �� �� �� �� �� ��
Naval vessels �� 1 �� 1 �� 2
Missiles and launchers 144 �� �� �� �� 144
In October 1997, the Chinese government published the Regulations of the
People's Republic of China on the Control of Military Products Export,
stipulating that a licensing system shall be practiced for China's
weapons exports, and all external transfers of domestic military products
shall be carried out by the departments authorized by the government and
companies approved and registered by the government. The Regulations
state that the business activities of such departments and companies must
remain strictly within the projects approved by the government, that
contracts of military products transfers must require approval from the
relevant competent government departments before taking effect, and that
important items of arms exports must be submitted to the State Council
and the Central Military Commission for approval.
China has been consistently cautious and responsible regarding the
transfer of missiles. China is not a member state of the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and has not joined its formulation and
revision, but, in accordance with China's consistent position on
non-proliferation and its principles concerning arms exports, the Chinese
government promised to observe the then guidelines and parameters of the
MTCR in February 1992. In October 1994, China reaffirmed its promise and
undertook the obligation of not exporting ground-to-ground missiles
inherently capable of reaching a range of at least 300 kilometers with a
payload of at least 500 kilograms. In line with the above policy, China
has exercised strict and effective control over the export of missiles
and related materials and has never done anything in violation of its
commitments.
The principles and measures to prevent the proliferation of weaponry and
unwarranted transfers of military equipment that China has consistently
upheld have helped to promote the development of international arms
control and disarmament in a wholesome way, and to maintain world peace
and regional stability.
Extracted http://www.hellomandarin.com
No comments:
Post a Comment